

PHILIP'S ACTIONS IN 347 AND EARLY 346 B.C.

Although much of great interest has been written recently about the period of the so-called Peace of Philocrates, little or nothing has been said of a passage which provides important information in Justin's Epitome of the *Historiae Philippicae* of Pompeius Trogus. This passage, 8.3.12–15, comes between the destruction of Olynthus (September, 348) and the arrival of the Athenian envoys at Pella (February, 346). In subject matter it corresponds with 'the subjugation of Thrace and Thessaly' (*Thracia atque Thessalia subactae*) in Prologue 8 of Pompeius Trogus – a topic which Justin began in 8.3.1–6 and continued in our passage, 8.3.12–15.¹

1. JUSTIN 8.3.12–8.4.2

Inde, quasi omnia quae agitasset animo ei licerent, auraria in Thessalia, argenti metalla in Thracia occupat, et ne quod ius vel fas inviolatum praetermitteret, piraticam quoque exercere instituit. His ita gestis forte evenit, ut eum fratres duo, reges Thraciae, non contemplatione iustitiae eius, sed invicem metuentes, ne alterius viribus accederet, disceptationum suarum iudicem eligerent. Sed Philippus more ingenii sui ad iudicium veluti ad bellum inopinantibus fratribus instructo exercitu supervenit regnoque utrumque non iudicis more, sed fraude latronis ac scelere spoliavit. Dum haec aguntur, legati Atheniensium petentes pacem ad eum venerunt. Quibus auditis et ipse legatos Athenas cum pacis condicionibus misit; ibique ex commodo utrorumque pax facta.

['Thereafter, as if everything he had turned over in his mind was permissible for him, he seized gold mines in Thessaly and silver mines in Thrace, and lest he should leave any law or right unviolated, he began to practise piracy as well. After these actions it happened by chance that two brothers, kings of Thrace, chose him to be judge of their disputes not from regard for his uprightness but from their own mutual fear that he would join the other party's forces. But Philip showed his usual flair: he came upon the unsuspecting brothers to give judgement with his army marshalled as if to wage war, and deprived each of them of his kingdom not in the role of a judge but in the criminal manner of a treacherous brigand. While these things were being done, envoys of Athens seeking peace came to him. After hearing them he too sent envoys to Athens with his conditions of peace; and there in the interest of both parties peace was made. ']

The temporal sequence is very clearly marked by *inde*, *his ita gestis*, *dum haec aguntur*, and *quibus auditis*. Within the sequence we may put the actions in Thessaly

¹ The following abbreviations are used:

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| Badian | E. Badian, 'Philip II and Thrace', <i>Pulpudiva</i> 4 (1983), 51–71. |
| Buckler | J. Buckler, <i>Philip II and the Sacred War</i> (London, 1989). |
| Cawkwell | G. Cawkwell, <i>Philip of Macedon</i> (London, 1978). |
| Ellis | J. R. Ellis, <i>Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism</i> (London, 1976). |
| Hammond, <i>DSW</i> | N. G. L. Hammond, 'Diodorus' narrative of the Sacred War', <i>JHS</i> 57 (1937), 44ff. |
| Hammond, <i>Sources D</i> | idem, 'The sources of Diodorus xvi' (part one), <i>CQ</i> 31 (1937), 79ff. |
| Hammond, <i>Sources J</i> | idem, 'The sources of Justin on Macedonia to the death of Philip', <i>CQ</i> 41 (1991), 496ff. |
| HM | idem, <i>A History of Macedonia I</i> (Oxford, 1972); idem and G. T. Griffith, <i>A History of Macedonia II</i> (Oxford, 1979). |
| Markle, <i>Peace</i> | M. M. Markle, <i>The Peace of Philocrates</i> (Diss. Princeton, 1970). |
| Markle | idem, 'The strategy of Philip in 346 B.C.', <i>CQ</i> 24 (1974), 253ff. |
| P-C | A. W. Pickard-Cambridge, <i>Demosthenes</i> (London, 1985). |
| Schaefer | A. Schaefer, <i>Demosthenes und seine Zeit I–III</i> (Leipzig, 1885–7). |
| Westlake | H. D. Westlake, <i>Thessaly in the Fourth Century B.C.</i> (London, 1935). |
| Wirth | G. Wirth, <i>Philip II</i> (Stuttgart, 1985). |

and Thrace and the start of the piracy in the first half of 347, the outwitting of the Thracian kings in the latter half of 347 and the settlement in Thrace continuing into February 346, and the Athenian envoys reaching Pella in February, 346.² At Athens peace was concluded in April, 346. Let us consider each item in turn.

2. PHILIP IN THESSALY

Justin had described the earlier situation in Thessaly where a number of city-states were destroyed, some even having served under Philip as commander (*dux*) in the past (8.3.2). The probable explanation is that after the defeat of Philip by Onomarchus in 353 some cities deserted from the Thessalian League, of which Philip was the elected *archon*, and joined the side of the Phocians and Pherae; and then that, when the decisive victory was won on the Crocus Field and the tyrants of Pherae left Thessaly in 352, some city-states were punished for sacrilege as well as for treachery.³ In our passage Philip was in Thessaly 'seizing gold mines' (*auraria* sc. *metalla*). As there are no such mines in Thessaly, Trogus or Justin has introduced a mistake in abbreviating, and we should suggest something like *vectigalia* ('revenues') in its place.⁴ That Philip should be in Thessaly early in 347 was to be expected. For during the war with Athens and the Chalcidian League he had been diverted to Pherae, from which he expelled the ex-tyrant Peitholaus;⁵ and now that his hands were free he presumably consolidated his authority in Thessaly.

That he did operate in Thessaly after the Chalcidian War was in fact indicated by Polybius in a speech attributed to Chlaeneas. After describing Olynthus as having very great prestige and power Chlaeneas continued. 'Having enslaved this city and made an example of it Philip not only became master of the Thraceward cities⁶ but also made the Thessalians subject to himself in their terror' (*ὅφ' αὐτὸν ἐποιήσατο* 9.28.3, a phrase similar to Trogus' *Thessalia atque Thracia subactae*). That this terror was fresh in early 347 rather than in 344 is obvious.⁷ In 347 Philip was no doubt preparing to use Thessaly as his base and the Thessalian cavalry as his supporters in the near future, when he would intervene in the Sacred War. Operations in southern Thessaly continued into early 346. For Philip was helping Pharsalus to reassert its authority over Halus in Achaea Phthiotis, which was under siege in February, 346.⁸ Isocrates complimented Philip on his settlement of Thessaly in *Philippus* 20, of which the final version was probably sent with the second Athenian mission to Philip in May, 346.⁹ Isocrates was referring not only to events of 352 but also to those of 347.

3. PHILIP IN THRACE

Which were the silver mines in Thrace seized by Philip in 347? At 8.3.6 Justin had reported the killing of 'neighbouring kings' (*occisis finitimis regibus*) in Thrace at some time after late 352. It is important to remember that Philip's conquests before

² I am here following the chronology used in *HM* 2, which is based mainly on Hammond, *DSW*. That proposed by Buckler 148–95 is to me unconvincing.

³ See *HM* 2.270–3, 279 and 286.

⁴ They were the subject of dispute earlier, according to Demosthenes (D. 1.22, in 349); Alexander later acquired them (Just. 11.3.2 *exemplo patris*). ⁵ See *HM* 2.320.

⁶ Those of the Chalcidic peninsula in general.

⁷ The date which is usually given for this is 344; see F. W. Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius* 2 (1967), 165.

⁸ When Halus was captured, it was delivered over to Pharsalus which enslaved the population (D. 19.39 and 334). It may well have joined Onomarchus during his march along this coast in 353 or 352. ⁹ Isoc. 5.7.

346 were along the Thracian coast, so that we have mentions of Amphipolis, Neapolis, Crenides, Maronea, Abdera and Cypsela.¹⁰ It was apparently inland kings who were killed, since the rival controllers of the coastal areas – Cetriporis, Amadocus and Cersobleptes – became one after the other client-kings of Philip. Of the region inland of Amphipolis Cetriporis was once the master; for there are references to hawking in the marshy land of his one-time kingdom, probably by the shallow Lake Prasias.¹¹ There are rich deposits of silver (and also of lead, gold and iron pyrites) at Akhladhokhori in the territory of the Odomantes, east of the Rupel Pass.¹² The silver of the coinage which Cetriporis issued came no doubt from those mines. They were evidently seized by Philip in early 347, and it follows that he reduced Cetriporis to the status of a subordinate king at that time.

Philip was in a position to 'practise piracy', because he had developed a fleet of triaconters and penteconters, which were fast under oar and could attack the small merchantmen of the time.¹³ Athens and Philip being at war raided each other's shipping in the northern Aegean. Each accused the other of 'piracy'. Demosthenes, writing of the situation in the sailing season of 347, claimed that Macedonian 'territory was plundered by the pirates and the ports were blockaded' (19.315), from which we may infer that Athenian warships cooperated with these pirates.¹⁴ Philip certainly retaliated, his ships raiding as they had done after the end of the Social War in 355/4 (Aeschin. 2.72).¹⁵

The two 'brothers' who were kings of Thrace in late 347 were Amadocus and Cersobleptes, because Cetriporis had already been absorbed by Philip. They were certainly members of the Odrysian royal house and closely related, but on occasion they had fought against one another. Amadocus held an area west of the river Hebrus (D. 23.183), and Cersobleptes an area east of the river, and they had remained in power by allying themselves sometimes with Athens and sometimes with Philip.¹⁶ Now Philip, summoned to arbitrate between them over their disputes, came with his army and deprived each of his kingdom (Just. 8.3.15). A Scholiast to Aeschines stated that Cersobleptes went to war against Amadocus, Byzantium and Perinthus 'about disputed territory', and that Philip intervened so forcibly that Cersobleptes had to surrender the territory. There is no doubt that Justin and the Scholiast referred to the

¹⁰ For Cypsela see Athenae. 469a, and for comment Badian 62 n. 43.

¹¹ Arist. *HA* 9.36.620a, and *Mir.* 11.8.841b15; see Griffith in *HM* 2.252f. Of the lakes 'inland of' (ὕπερ) Amphipolis the southern one (Cercinitis) is too close to Amphipolis to have lain in Cetriporis' kingdom. It is therefore the northern one (Prasias).

¹² See *HM* I Map 1 and P. 14. ¹³ See my article in *Antichthon* 26 (1992), 30–41.

¹⁴ P-C 229 had no doubt that both the raiding force and the blockading force were carried by Athenian ships. There may have been pirates acting in collusion with Athens.

¹⁵ The date for Philip's raids on Lemnos, Imbros and Scyros, and for Athenian cleruchs leaving the Chersonese in this passage of Aeschines is controversial. I give my reasons at *Antichthon* 26 (1992), 31 for dating the events to 355/4. Most scholars have dated them to late 348 or early 347 as a consequence of the fall of Olynthus (e.g. Griffith in *HM* 2.331, Cawkwell 92 with 198 n. 2, and Wirth 77 with n. 14); but Athens suffered no naval defeat in 349/8, and she would not have countenanced a flight then by her cleruchs from the Chersonese.

¹⁶ D. 23.183 and *FGrH* 115 (Theopompus) F 101. Cersobleptes was a son of the Odrysian king Cotys (see *HM* 2.195). There was an Odrysian king whom Isocrates called 'the old Amadocus' (5.6), probably the Amadocus who was active c. 390 (X. *HG*. 4.8.26). Then there were a father and a son called Amadocus, and it was the son who made alliance with Philip against Cersobleptes (*FGrH* 115 (Theopompus) F 101). It is uncertain whether 'the old Amadocus' was the same person as the father of Philip's ally; for Theopompus did not say that the father was a king. It seems that in Philip's time Cetriporis, Amadocus and Cersobleptes were all members of the Odrysian royal family and were therefore called loosely 'fratres' by Justin. Griffith in *HM* 2.282f. and Badian 59 n. 31 differed from one another about the Amadoci.

same situation, which developed in late 347 and extended into early 346. The probability is strong that they both drew on the same source.¹⁷

The Scholiast added the further important point, that Philip, 'taking Cersobleptes' son from him as hostage, secured Cersobleptes as king in his own (Philip's) interest' (ad Aeschin. 2.81). That must have happened towards the end of the situation in Thrace, that is in early 346. Such a timing accords well with what Aeschines said at 2.81; for he was referring apparently to the arrival of the first embassy at Pella (late in February, 346). 'I and all the other envoys saw the son of Cersobleptes serving as hostage with Philip'. The sight was obviously surprising and disconcerting. That was why Aeschines reported it so emphatically. It was the first indication to Aeschines and the other envoys that Cersobleptes had suffered some major defeat.¹⁸

4. THE JUSTIN PASSAGE AND THEOPOMPUS

An overlap of the actions of Philip in Thessaly and Thrace with the opening diplomatic exchanges is indicated by the linking phrase 'dum haec aguntur'. This overlap consisted of the advance of Philip's influence in Thessaly, as instanced at Halus, and in Thrace, where the taking of Cersobleptes' son hostage was news to the Athenian envoys. The diplomatic exchanges are in the proper sequence. The peace was concluded on the Athenian side in that the oaths were taken at Athens. The implication of Justin's 'pax facta' at Athens was that it was concluded bilaterally. In fact it was not yet in force on the Macedonian side, and it would not be in force until Philip and his allies' representatives should take the oaths. It is clear from the choice of the word 'piracy' to denote Macedonian naval activity and from the suggestion that the peace was complete that the source used by Trogus was pro-Athenian.

The fragments of Theopompus which come from numbered books show that Justin's sequence of events was the same as that of Theopompus.¹⁹ For the destruction of Olynthus and the settlement of Chalcidice were recounted in book 25 F 152. Then in book 26 F 162 Theopompus described the success of Philip in gaining popularity with the Thessalians by taking part in their debauches and drinking-parties. In F 160 and F 161 he mentioned two places in Thrace. In the second of these 'Antipater was staying near Apros'. This city lay not far from the Sacred Mountain (Hieron Oros), which overlooked the coast of the Propontis northeast of the Chersonese.²⁰ In the same book F 165 mentioned the arrival of Macedonian envoys in Athens, i.e. in mid-April, 346. Since Antipater was the leading envoy, his stay near Apros must have been earlier, i.e. around the time when Philip took Cersobleptes' son hostage. In book 30, which included the acceptance of the peace in F 166, in F 170 the Thessalians were said to have razed a city called Kolakeia, of which the

¹⁷ Griffith in *HM* 2.282f. discussed the Scholiast but did not mention Justin 8.3.14-15. Beloch, *GG*² 3.2.282f., followed by Markle, *Peace* 41, placed the Scholiast's war in spring 347, but they both failed to notice Justin 8.3.14-15.

¹⁸ Markle, *Peace* 43 n. 3 held that it was the envoys on the second embassy who saw Cersobleptes' son; but if the Scholiast to Aeschin. 2.81 and Just. 8.3.14-15 refer to the same episode, the timing given by Justin indicates that the envoys of the first embassy saw his son. Ellis 110 dated the taking of Cersobleptes' son hostage to 351 (267 n. 85 with reservations), and Griffith in *HM* 2.283 to 352. If so, the Athenians in the Chersonese would have informed Athens at the time. By 346 it would have been old stuff, and Aeschines would not have made a point of reporting it in 346. Badian 62 distrusts the Scholiast's comment.

¹⁹ Badian 66 n. 53 commented on the Theopompus fragments but did not relate them to Justin 8.3.10-15.

²⁰ Apros occurs twice as the donor of the silver vessels to Cotys which were found in the Rogozen Treasure.

Malians were in possession; this operation was probably connected with the organisation of affairs from southern Thessaly, of which the attack on Halus was not completed until the summer of 346.

The coincidence in the sequence of events in Justin and in the fragments of Theopompus is of some importance, as we turn to consider what source was being used by Trogus in compiling the account which Justin has abbreviated. In my article on the sources of Justin in *CQ* 41 (1991) I did not make use of this coincidence. But on other grounds I demonstrated that the source behind the whole of book 8 – including of course 8.3.12–4.2 – was Theopompus. His general portrayal of Philip as ruthless, treacherous and cunning and of his opponents as divided among themselves and as utterly stupid is fully exemplified in the report of Philip's actions in Thessaly and in Thrace and in practising piracy (8.3.12–15). Thus the conclusion is, I think, certain that the author on whom Trogus drew for our passage was Theopompus. As G. L. Barber put it, 'Theopompus was remarkable for wide and critical research and for the harshness of his verdicts'.²¹ Since he was a close contemporary of Philip and since he stayed at the court of Philip in 342 (*FGrH* 115 T 7), he had every opportunity to ascertain what happened in Thessaly, Thrace, the Aegean Sea, and Athens in the years 348–346. We may well disagree with the harshness of his verdicts, but we must accept as accurate the facts which he gave and the order in which he presented them.²²

5. THE POLICY OF PHILIP FROM LATE 348 TO EARLY 346

The policy of Philip in this period is fairly clear. The destruction of Olynthus and the political subjection of some thirty Greek city-states of the Chalcidic peninsula sent a wave of shock and alarm through the Greek mainland. Philip used that shock to bring the Thessalian city-states firmly under his control (Plb. 9.28.3 ὑφ' αὐτὸν ἐποιήσατο). He won the favour of the Thessalian leaders by his genial hospitality and his participation in their debauchery (Theopompus F 162). While forces under his command reduced recalcitrant city-states such as Halus, he left the decision about their subsequent status to the Thessalian authorities, for instance those of Pharsalus.²³ Isocrates in *Philippus* 20 (writing before the first envoys reached Pella) remarked that Philip had established a close friendship with the 'Thessalians' (i.e. of the Thessalian League) and had so treated the cities of the neighbouring areas (the so-called *Perioecis*) that he won some into alliance and destroyed others which annoyed him excessively.²⁴ This process was completed only after the conclusion of the Peace of Philocrates; for then Halus was captured, delivered into the hands of Pharsalus and destroyed by the Pharsalians (D. 19.39 and 334).²⁵ The purpose of Philip was to

²¹ In N. G. L. Hammond and H. H. Scullard (edd.), *The Oxford Classical Dictionary* (Oxford, 1970), 1059.

²² The distinction between the contemporary historians – Theopompus and Ephorus – and the orators is important. The historians aimed to give the correct sequence. Demosthenes and Aeschines aimed to deceive their audience, each giving his own preferred sequence.

²³ Pharsalus, situated at a main cross-roads and having a superb, very large acropolis, seems to have displaced Larissa as the leading state in the Thessalian League at this time. See Westlake 186f.

²⁴ Griffith in *HM* 2.223 n. 3 argued that the expression τῶν δὲ πόλεων τῶν περὶ τὸν τόπον ἐκείνων referred not to Thessaly of the previous sentence (Θετταλοὺς μὲν) but to 'cities near Macedonia', a most vague definition. I do not find his view acceptable.

²⁵ It is probable that Gomphi was taken over at this time and received Macedonian settlers, the town being renamed 'Philippi' (Steph. Byz. s.v.). It lay on the western fringe of the plain at a point from which a route leads through the Pindus range to Ambracia (see Hammond, *Epirus*, 256 and 284).

ensure the collaboration of the Thessalian League in bringing the Sacred War to an end and the full support of the representatives of the Thessalians and the neighbouring 'tribes' on the Council of the Amphictyonic League, which (he foresaw) would decide the fate of Phocis.

An important place in Philip's policy was taken by Athens. He preferred to use persuasion rather than force in obtaining peace and alliance with her, but at the same time the chief factor in persuasion was the threat of force. The most immediate threat to Athens was by land. If Macedonia, Thessaly and Boeotia could act together, enter Phocis and defeat the mercenaries, there was nothing to stop them from proceeding to attack Athens as the ally and the accomplice of Phocis in the Sacred War. That threat was effective when party-strife (*stasis*) in Phocis prevented Athens from occupying the Pass of Thermopylae in February, 346; for Athens immediately thereafter sent envoys to Philip to discuss terms of peace. The other threat to Athens was an attack on the corn-ships as they sailed through the Bosphorus and the Hellespont towards the Peiraeus; for she relied upon them to feed her population. In 347 and early 346 Philip imposed his will on Thracian rulers and finally on Cersobleptes, as Isocrates noticed in *Philippus* 21. Thereby he controlled the coastal road from Macedonia to the Bosphorus. In February, 346 he was well placed to intercept shipping in the Bosphorus and to attack the Athenian cleruchies in the Chersonese. Moreover, he enjoyed in that area the alliance of Perinthus and Byzantium, was negotiating with Chios, Rhodes and their allies (*FGrH* 115 [Theopompus] F 164), and had himself built penteconters and triaconters which were ideal for raiding merchant-ships, or as the Athenians put it for 'piracy' (Just. 8.3.13).

As a counter-measure Athens relied on her cleruchs in the Chersonese, a small fleet there which was manned by mercenaries under an Athenian general, and while Cersobleptes was her ally a number of forts outside the Chersonese which were garrisoned by his Thracian troops (D. 18.27).²⁶ But the advance of Philip in early 346, including the fifty days between Athens taking the oaths to the Peace and Philip returning to Pella, resulted in the collapse of Cersobleptes and the loss of the forts (D. 19.156 for the timing, confirmed by D. 7.37, 8.64, 10.65 and 18.27).²⁷ It was obvious

²⁶ For these fortified places see Schaefer 2.247, Markle, *Peace* 50f., Ellis 104 and 265 n. 61, Badian 63f., and Wirth 84. One of them, Ergisce, was named as donor of three silver vessels to Cotys and of one to Cersobleptes in the Rogozen Treasure. For a discussion of the Treasure see G. Mihailov in *Linguistique Balkanique* 30 (1987), 5–19.

²⁷ In 341 Demosthenes changed his timing to after the conclusion of the peace in order to accuse Philip of treachery (9.15); see P-C 266f. In the passages cited in the text the insistence of Demosthenes leads one to suspect that he wanted to conceal the fact that many of Philip's actions in eastern Thrace had preceded the taking of the oaths by Athens and her Allies, which happened a few days after 19th Elaphebolion (D. 19.150–6). The truth of the matter can be deduced from Aeschines 2.90–2, because Aeschines cited official documents. Cersobleptes finally 'lost his kingdom' in the course of Elaphebolion (2.92). This loss was reported to the Assembly at Athens on a day when Demosthenes was presiding, namely on the 25th of Elaphebolion, on the strength of a letter from Chares which had reached Athens on the previous day, the 24th (2.90, the latter date referring not to the loss, as Schaefer 2.246, Beloch, *GG*² 3.2.282, and Markle, *Peace* 44 and 135f., supposed, but to the arrival of the letter). We do not know how long it took for the news of the loss to reach Chares and for Chares' letter from the Chersonese to reach Athens, but we may hazard as a guess some ten days. The loss, then, culminating in Philip's capture of the Sacred Mountain (2.90), occurred about 14 Elaphebolion, four days before the meeting of the Assembly on 18 Elaphebolion which discussed terms of peace. The Scholiast to D. 19.162 gave the defence made by Philip, that he had taken 'them' (presumably the forts) 'before the oaths' – that is before the oaths were taken by Athens and her Allies, soon after 19th Elaphebolion (some on 25th Elaphebolion according to Aeschines 3.73); for Philip was replying to a protest delivered by Eucleides after that date. Ellis 110 and 265 n. 61 put the capture of the forts after 23rd Elaphebolion; P-C 267 had Philip capture the Sacred

now that Philip had an excellent chance, together with his allies, of cutting the route of the corn-ships through the Bosphorus; and if he so wished of invading the Chersonese from the territory of his ally Cardia.

Philip could not have timed the double threat of force more skilfully. His approach to the Bosphorus was initiated and conducted in accordance with his own will. The possibility of an overland attack by the combined forces of Macedonia, Thessaly and Boeotia was a constant danger for Athens in the early months of 346. But it was made immediate by events which were outside Philip's control, namely the party-strife in Phocis which prevented Athens and Sparta from taking possession of the Pass of Thermopylae in February, 346 and made it probable that Philip would attack a greatly weakened Phocis. It is no wonder that Athens despatched her ten envoys post-haste to Pella in that month.

6. CURRENT VIEWS ON THIS PERIOD

Writing of the situation in 352, Griffiths stated that Philip 'did not return to Heraion Teichos or the vicinity, so far as we know, for five years after this. Although he remained at war with the Athenians till 346, he was not concerned evidently to squeeze them by threatening the Chersonese again, and this though his successes of 352 had laid a good foundation' (*HM* 2.284). Griffith therefore placed the taking of Cersobleptes' son hostage in 352, and he added that the son 'was encountered by Aeschines and other Athenian ambassadors nearly six years later' (282–3).²⁸ Consequently 'throughout the year 347 Philip held his hand...no great military move, then, came out of Macedonia in 347' (330–1). In the chronological table which he constructed the only entry between winter 348/7 and early 346 was '*stasis* in Phocis: Phalaecus loses command' (724); there is nothing whatever for Philip. Griffith did not offer any explanation for Philip's lapse into 'inactivity (relatively speaking)' (331) – indeed into total inactivity for a year and a half on his reckoning. Badian, writing of 'Philip and Thrace' after Griffith had written and being critical of Griffith, stated that from 353/2 'Philip did not make another appearance in Thrace until 346, when he had practically won the Sacred War' and 'it was not until 346, when the Athenians were ready to make peace and had already sent an embassy to Pella for that purpose, that Philip dared to invade Thrace again' (63). He too did not explain the reason for Philip's supposed inactivity and lack of daring in regard to Thrace for some five or six years. Neither Griffith nor Badian paid any attention to Justin 8.3.12–15. Buckler took the same line as they had done. In a similar manner Pickard-Cambridge had not made use of Justin 8.3.12–15 and had kept Philip inactive over the same period (P-C 228–39 and 266; and in *CAH* 6 [1927], 233–7).

Ellis noted that there was some activity in Thrace in 347. He placed then the manning of some forts by Cersobleptes in alliance with Athens (104), and he inferred from Theopompus F 160 that Antipater was involved in 'a preliminary campaign' in Thrace, for which he suggested a date in the second half of 347 (266 n. 62). He was unsure whether Cersobleptes' son was taken hostage in 351 or in 346 (267 n. 85). He referred to Justin 8.3.14–15 but dated its content – Philip arbitrating and then seizing the kingdoms of the two Thracian 'brothers' – apparently to 351 (267 n. 88).

Mountain 'on the day before the Athenians themselves took the oath'; Badian 66 n. 63 was critical of Ellis' interpretation. The Sacred Mountain, being 'the acropolis of the territory' (Str. 7 fr. 55), was presumably Cersobleptes' last stronghold in 346. Wirth 84f. held that the Macedonian siege of this fort began 'probably in 347'.

²⁸ So too P-C 179 and Schaefer 1.447 n. 2 without referring to Just. 8.3.14–15.

Cawkwell referred to Justin 8.3.12–13 (198 n. 2) and placed in 347 an action of Antipater in Thrace, seizure of Thracian silver mines, and raids by Macedonian warships (92); but he did not envisage any major campaign by Philip in Thrace until the spring of 346 (98).

It was a defect of these and other recent writings that little or no attention was paid to the source-criticism which is essential if we are to evaluate the evidence supplied by Diodorus, Justin and Pausanias. The attitude was typified by the following statements. 'Neither Diodorus nor Justin should be taken as credible evidence for Philip's earliest Thessalian adventures' – without considering whether Diodorus drew on Ephorus at 16.14.1–2 and whether Justin drew on Theopompus at 7.6.6–9, Ephorus and Theopompus both being contemporary historians of the events. Similarly 'no credence need be given to Justin, whose epitome of Pompeius Trogus is demonstrably defective'.²⁹ Griffith and Ellis gave general approval to my analysis of the sources of Diodorus 16, and they suggested that Trogus might have drawn on Theopompus; but they did not themselves engage in detailed source-criticism. And 'the second-century A.D. geographer Pausanias' was cited as if he was writing out of his own head and had not drawn upon a source which was probably an Amphictyonic record (as at 10.33.9, the Amphictyonic decree penalising the cities of Phocis in 346).³⁰ If we read the texts carefully and analyse the sources on which they rested, we gain on my interpretation a new insight into the activities and the policy of Philip between the sack of Olynthus and the opening gambit of the Peace of Philocrates.

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²⁹ The quotations are from Buckler 57 and 135 n. 42.

³⁰ Cawkwell 108.